Using data of Italian public healthcare providers over years 2001 through 2008, we evaluate the impact of two policies adopted by Italian Regions (i.e., States) to cope with increasing medical malpractice costs using a Difference-in-Difference specification. We assess the impact of the policies on premiums paid and legal expenditures. The first policy consisted in collecting information and monitoring both compensation requests and any legal action related to a medical malpractice claim against a public healthcare provider. The second policy is a switch from private to public insurance for damages up to 500,000 euros combined with a centralized-regional contracting out in the private insurance market for damages in excess of 500,000 euros. Both policies represent attempts to cope with multiple agency problems within the public sector. Our results show that the impact of central monitoring in malpractice claims trend can reduce up to 29% the premiums paid for the treated providers, while the effect is obviously stronger for public insurance (41%). We control for the effects of the latter also on the trend of legal expenditures as proxy for common pool behaviors which do not result from our data. Validity tests show that our results are not driven by a decreasing trend affecting the insurance expenditures of the analyzed units before the policies' introduction.
Introduction
Soaring expenditures due to medical malpractice have become a major policy concern in both private and public healthcare systems because of the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance premiums, compensation amounts, and defensive medicine (OECD (2006) ). However, the widespread increase in premiums can bite public healthcare systems more than private, due to soft budget constraints problems which often characterize the public system. There is an interplay of multiple agency problems when medical malpractice insurance is acquired by a public agent from the private market. 1 The public agency in charge of bargaining with the private insurance is one layer of government (generally the provider of the healthcare services) which might not have adequate incentives to fully internalize the bargaining (and contract) costs compared to the layer of government (generally the State) which has to pay the final bill. Related to this, there may be lack of incentives for the public agency bargaining with the private insurer to acquire adequate information on the service risks the public is contracting out to the private. For instance, as medical malpractice is concerned, a public hospital could not invest appropriate resources in collecting information on its own exposure to risk, both in terms of claims' frequency and awarded compensations.
The State has two options to cope with this framework: first it can bypass the agency problem by directly providing public insurance coverage, which, in first-best world, is known to be theoretically more efficient (Arrow and Lind (1970) ); second, it can try to collect and spread information on malpractice to curb the lack of incentives that characterizes providers in raising their level knowledge. The latter solution, which could be linked to a process of budget hardening, should work as an incentive on the basis of a I-know-that-you-know-that-I-know-that-you-know game between the State and its suppliers. Its rationale lays in making both the State and counterparts more informed, and consequently, for instance, better able to work out efficient contracts and policies. This is particularly important when insurance contracts need to follow the process of public procurement auctions. 2 In this paper we analyze the case for a higher level of State involvement in medical malpractice insurance and monitoring when the healthcare system is mainly public. We implement a Differencein-Difference strategy using Italian data at the public provider level from 2001 to 2008 to evaluate 1) the relative efficiency of Regions (an administrative level equivalent to States) 3 oriented as opposed to market oriented solutions in terms of affordability of malpractice premiums (public insurance), and 2) the impact of a regional monitoring activity on the medical liability insurance premiums paid by the public healthcare providers, with the counterpart typically a private insurance provider. We 1 The same argument can be used for the contracting out of other services. 2 For a political economy evaluation of better quality public auctions -more bidders, higher rebates, and mobility of bidders, among the others -see Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010) , who use data on Italian municipalities.
3 For a matter of simplicity, in this paper we use Regions and States interchangeably.
exploit the adoption of two medical malpractice related policies, given that they were introduced only in some Regions and in different years.
In particular, the monitoring policy is implemented by a regional monitoring system that collects data on both the number of compensation claims and legal action related to malpractice litigation. Adopting this system, Regions collect information on civil and criminal claims against public healthcare providers operating in their jurisdictions, from the stage of filing a suit to the end of trial, or to a settlement: eight Regions out of twenty-one have chosen this approach between 1997 and
2008. Within a system where each public provider can contract out its risk to the private sector, an increase in available information on malpractice could, for instance, have a positive impact on the public procurement procedure, since also the private insurer knows that the principal (State) knows.
The public insurance solution has been adopted by two Regions, which modeled the malpractice insurance plan according to a "mixed" scheme. Adopting Regions provide full coverage to their hospitals for damages up to 500,000 euros. 4 The healthcare providers are required to contribute to the pooled insurance. The private insurers are then called in for coverage in excess of the damage liability, so that the private insurer will apply a deduction of 500,000 euros, and the insurance contract is signed between the Region and the private company following a centralized bargaining process typically based on public procurement auctions. While the pros of this solution should be apparent (a drop in paid premiums and a reduction of transactions costs when the contracting out is in place), it is not always easy to devise empirical evaluation of the cons. If the pooled risks are managed without adequate monitoring, it could trigger higher frequency of malpractice claims due to a watering down of precaution standards. In order to control for this side effect, we devise an impact evaluation of adopting public insurance on legal expenditures per provider. A significant increase in legal expenditures could be read as an increase in compensation requests. Finally, we argue that rough cost-benefits calculations are needed when considering a public insurance solution.
Obviously, if on average Regions end up paying more in compensations for malpractice claims than it would cost them to pay a private insurer, then this private solution would still be the more convenient option. It is impossible to make accurate evaluations for our case study.
Our main results from the Difference-in-Difference estimation show that both policies have an impact on insurance premiums paid by public healthcare providers: the monitoring policy decreases up to 29% of the premiums paid, while the switch to public insurance plus centralized contracting out decreased them up to 40%. Legal expenditures do not seem to be systematically affected by the implemented policies, but a positive coefficient is associated to the introduction of public insurance. The findings are robust to the introduction of covariates which could potentially explain the 4 One of the two Regions, Piemonte, sets a deductible equal to 1,500 euros, which can be considered as negligible given the average granted compensation in the same Region was 27,575 euros on average-data for . See Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2011 different trends in premiums among structures and Regions: for instance the migrations of patients to structures behold to have higher qualitative standards. Results are also robust to placebo test such as the introduction of "fake" policies which confirm that our results are not driven by a decreasing trend in premiums or legal expenditures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides reference to the literature mainly related to our research question.Section 3 lays out the institutional framework and our econometric strategy.
Section 4 describes our dataset. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature Review
The causes of the last decades' skyrocketing increase of the insurance premiums for medical liability have been addressed by many works and according to different perspectives. Insurance companies blame legal professionals (i.e. with incentives to file ungrounded claims) and the inefficiency of the legal system (e.g. lottery-like compensations); lawyers blame the insurance companies (e.g. inadequate adjustments of the reserves); and physicians/hospitals blame both insurance companies (i.e.
unavailable or prohibitive insurance coverage) and the legal system (e.g. amounts of compensation awards) (see, for instance, AMA (2011)). Although several authors have tried to link the premiums' growth or the decisions of private insurance companies to withdraw from the market of medical liability to specificity of malpractice claims (e.g. Mello (2006) , it has been difficult to establish such a link. As stated by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), given the available information, it is not clear whether or not the affordability and the availability crisis affecting the insurance market for malpractice at least in the U.S. is related to insurance cycles rather than to frequency of malpractice claims or to compensations of iatrogenic damages awarded (GAO (2003a) , GAO (2003b) , and
GAO (2003c)).
Governments reacted to the policy challenge related to medical malpractice according to the type of their healthcare system by taking initiatives to lower premiums paid and reduce creamskimming distortions in medical practice (i.e., negative defensive medicine, see Danzon (2000) ).
In countries such as the U.S., where the healthcare system is mainly private, States adopted legal reforms shaping the liability system, such as caps on the amount of damages awarded in cases of medical malpractice, which have been among the most popular types of reform (e.g., see Sloan (1985) ; Williams and Mello (2006); Kessler (2011) (2007)). 6 Most of these studies have identified caps on noneconomic damages as the most effective reform. Following the introduction of noneconomic damage caps, medical malpractice premiumseither at the State or at the individual physician level-usually fall. In some cases, States sponsored forms of physicians' self-insurance (bedpan mutuals) which eventually ended up with an important role in the market for medical liability (Mello and Brennan (2003) ). 7
In countries with mainly public healthcare systems, such as most European countries, rising malpractice costs have often induced governments to replace private with public insurance. In some case, such as Sweden's, this shift to public insurance was accompanied by the adoption of a no fault liability system, 8 while in others, such as for the U.K., an enterprise fault liability system was adopted. The risk of individual physicians directly employed by the National Health System (NHS) was transfered to the NHS hospitals (see Fenn, Gray, and Rickman (2004) ) and the latter were subsequently covered by a public insurance scheme managed by the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA). 9 The English case study pinpoints the importance of the principal (NHS) control on its agents (hospitals and their employees), since public providers have limited incentives to take efficient levels of care. Yet, estimations of side-effects consequences for the public sector are difficult, because the reform was implemented throughout the entire system.
3 Institutional framework
The Italian HealthCare System
The Italian National Health System provides universal coverage to citizens. 10 The current organization and management of the Italian NHS is done at three levels: at the central level, by the national State; at the regional level, by each Region; within each Region, by population-based local health units (LHUs) (Aziende Sanitarie Locali) "independent" hospitals (IHs)(Aziende Ospedaliere), research hospitals (RHs)(Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico)-essential to perform research and provide assistance with specific pathologies-, and, in case a medical school is present, 6 For the assessment of the link between malpractice pressure and treatment decisions, with specific reference to the costs of defensive medicine, see Kessler and McClellan (1996) and Kessler and McClellan (2002) . 7 See for instance the case of the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA), which argues that in 2003 a share equal to the 60% of the insurance market for physician liability was run by other than "commercial" companies. The number was equal to 40% for the hospitals' liability (PIIA (2003)). 8 For an updated report on the Swedish public insurance plan see at -link on sweden-. 9 The public insurance formula-the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST)-pools malpractice risks of public structures and this process took place initially with hospitals left free to set their deductibles but after 2002 the NHSLA provided a full coverage for claims (see Gray (2007) and Fenn, Gray, Rickman, Vencappa, Rivero, and Lotti (2010) ). 10 Healthcare is mainly provided by public entities and citizens are not allowed to opt out from the system and search private healthcare only (Lo Scalzo, Donatini, Orzella, Cicchetti, Profili, and Maresso (2009) (France, Taroni, and Donatini (2005) ). Regional
Governments are in charge for the entire healthcare budget and are responsible for its management to both their residents and the National State, as in a decentralized system. Regions are responsible, among other things, for ensuring the delivery of the healthcare, for the allocation of resources to the healthcare providers, and for the "accreditation " of public and private health providers with the system (CERGAS, SEVERAL years).
Regions are free to regulate and finance health care services additional to the required LEA (Fiorentini, Lippi Bruni, and Ugolini (2008) (2004) ). Patients are covered by health plans provided by LHUs according to their place of residence even though they can also choose to receive hospital care from a hospital that does not belong neither to their LHU area nor to their region of residence. Therefore, a proxy for the health care 11 The current decentralized structure of the Italian Health System is the product of several reforms which starting from the Nineties tried to make the Regional governments more fiscal responsible, coping with soft-budget constraint problems (Bordignon and Turati (2009) ) on one side, and to make the overall mainly public system more competitive and efficient.
The reforms introduced managerialism, fiscal tools for decentralization and quasi-market mechanisms (Fattore (1999); Jommi, Cantu, and Anessi-Pessina (2001) ; France, Taroni, and Donatini (2005) ). In the aftermath of these reforms, the number of IHs increased while the number of LHUs decreased as Regions were trying to reshape their own health care governance, especially in those realities characterized by a stronger preference for competition (CERGAS, 2004) .
In 1992, before the reforms took place, there were 659 LHUs, they were reduced to 228 in 1995 and further reduced to 146 in 2010. LHUs' dimension care vary substantially: in some case a LHU can cover a municipalities, for bigger municipalities we have generally more than one LHUs, but in some case there might be just one LHU which cover an system quality can be provided by the mobility rates: internal mobility when migration takes place within the region of residence, and external mobility when migration involves structures outside the Region of residence. Providers in Northern regions are generally considered higher quality than their equivalent in the South and this seems to be confirmed by works (see for instance Fabbri and Robone (2010)) showing that the proportion of patients searching for hospital care outside of their LHUs of residence (exit rate) was higher for poorer Regions, with variation according to the type of care (more severe for patients with cancer).
Medical Malpractice: Legal Elements, the Insurance Market, and Regional Choices
Italy possesses no specific statute law to regulate the physician-patient relationship, although at- Injured patients can find compensation not only through the civil justice but also through the criminal system. 14 As a matter of fact, criminal judges can decide over the compensation due to medical liability even when the main indictment is criminal (i.e., minor or major personal injury) (Garoupa and Grembi (2010) ). Public health care providers (LHUs, IHs, RHs, THs, and hospitals directly managed by LHUs) are not legally obliged to insure for medical malpractice themselves, 1995 and 2004. 16 The ratio between the filed suits and the number of compensation 13 The main implication, in liability terms, is related to: 1) the burden of proof, which is on the defendant (physician or hospital) (Art. 1218 of Civil Code); 2) applicable provisions on professional diligence requirements (Art.1176 of Civil Code); 3) on the liability of an employee (Art. 2236 of Civil Code); and 4) the statute of limitations, currently ten years, rather than the standard five years for compensation claims not originating from a contract. For further detail, see Garoupa and Grembi (2010) . 14 Besides, they can sue both the physicians and the hospital. 15 According to the national contract signed on February 2005, the insurance needs to provide a coverage up to 1,549,370.68 euro for each case of damage, and up to 1,032,913.80 euro for each involved person. 16 There are no national data available on the number of paid requests. Just to have a reference mean -even though requests seems to be quite low (significantly lower than 20%), although the only evidence on this index is available for a very reduced number of regions (Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2011)).
Like all public agencies, public health care providers (LHUs, IHs, RHs and THs) are not allowed to go into the market to freely select an insurer: they need to open a call for tenders (public monitoring systems-Claims -for medical malpractice claims. In the same period, 2 out of 21 regions adopted a public insurance policy-InsMgmt -up to a compensation limit, which counts as a deductible on the private market for medical malpractice insurance. In Table 1 the timing of the policies and the Regions involved are specified.
plain comparisons should not be made given the differences in samples collections and healthcare systems-in Texas, the number of compensation requests was equal to 20 in 2000 (Black, Hyman, Silver, and Sage (2005) ). In Florida, in 2003, the median paid damage was equal to 150,000 dollar (300,000 the mean) (Vidmar, Lee, MacKillop, McCarthy, and McGwin (2005) ). 17 While according to the former the injury is dated at the moment in which it took place, the latter sets the injury date when the patient claims damage compensation. This is a de facto transfer of risks since the consequences of medical malpractice injuries can become apparent even after several years. 18 For a discussion of experience rating in medical malpractice insurance see Sloan (1990) . 19 Different attempts to estimate the cost of malpractice insurances for the Italian health care system have been done, but often the findings are aggregated or they cover limited time periods (MdS, 2006) . A 2005 estimation assesses in almost 600 millions euro the expenditure for medical malpractice premiums in that year. (2011)). Define Y irt as paid malpractice premiums or legal expenditures by provider i delivering health care in Region r at time t. We estimate the following equation:
where γ i is a vector of health care provider intercepts and λ t is a vector of year dummies, so that we control for both structure specific trends and time aggregated shocks. P ost1 t is a dummy equal to 1 if t ≥ t * 1 and 0 otherwise and Claims r is equal to 1 for Regions adopting monitoring. In this setting, t * 1 is equal to the adoption year of Claims. P ost2 t is a dummy equal to 1 if t ≥ t * 2 and 0 otherwise and InsM gmt r is equal to 1 for Regions adopting public insurance. Coherently to the previous case, t * 2 is equal to the adoption year of InsMgmt. δ and θ represent the DID estimators and they can be written according to the following standard equations
In our model we take into account two vectors of control variables per healthcare unit, X it , and regions, Z rt , which according to the literature on malpractice could have some impact on the trend of malpractice premiums as well as on legal expenditures (see, for instance, Thorpe (2004) ).
Z rt includes four regressors available at the regional level. The first set is composed by socioeconomic characteristics of the operational context of public health care providers which includes: 1) a weighted measure for the resident population per LHU calculated as the number of regional residents divided by the number of LHUs operating within the Region. Although an approximation, this variable provides an assessment of the patients set for which the LHUs have to buy or provide medical services either directly or through other structures. Therefore, this variable is a proxy for both dimensions and activity levels of LHUs, as well as the related structures that have to deal with them; 2) a litigation rate index calculated as the regional ordinary civil proceedings filed in First-Instance Courts weighted per 1,000 residents. It is important to include this variable because it can be a direct driver of legal expenditures and claims requests; 3) the average duration of First Instance cases resolution; and 4) the regional GDP to control for territorial differences in economic conditions of both the patients and the providers (partially funded by regional taxes).
X it groups structural characteristics of the providers. These include: 1) a set of dummies for the type of healthcare provider (LHUs, IHs, THs and RHs), since different structures tend to have different management and organizational arrangements, which might affect insurance; 2) the amount of medical personnel payroll, given that in Italy insurance companies set the premiums according to a percentage of the payroll; 3) two indexes to consider patients' mobility that providers need to manage. These indexes control for qualitative differences, which could affect the number of errors or the probability of patients filing claims. Hence, we use: a) the ratio of revenues due to medical care provided to residents from other public structures within the same region (entry rate), being higher revenues potentially associated with higher quality; b) the ratio of expenditures due to services that patients received by other public structures within the same Regions (exit rate). 20 The latter is an index for poor quality. In fact, it could not be interpreted differently: if exit rates were triggered by long waiting list, for instance, it would mean that the deserted providers are characterized by low quality level, being the length of waiting lists a proxy for quality.
Validity tests
The different performance in the terms of premiums expenditures could be driven by an anticipation effect or, in some case, the reforms could have caught up a trend triggered by the operational context characteristics. For instance, it could be the case that if hospitals do not get easily the insurance coverage then their paid premiums amount decreased because the structures were not able to get insurance in the first place, and we would have a decreasing trend independent from the treatments. 20 We did not use the mobility rates from and to out of the Region structures, cause the reliability of the data is not very accurate for this case. Generally the financial transfers are done among regions and not structures, even two years after the cares delivery. Therefore the financial values reported under out of the region mobility is severally underestimated.
See Anessi Pessina (2011).
Consequently, we run two falsification tests, one for each policy we have analyzed. For the monitoring policy, we run a placebo test, using a fake measure of the treatment (see table notes) estimating the following model Y irt = γ i + λ t + δP ost1 t _f ake * Claims r + θP ost2 t * InsM gmt r + X it β + Z rt ω + ε irt where P ost1 t _f ake is equal to 1 when providers operate in Regions adopting Claims and P ost1 t _f ake ≥ t_f ake with t_f ake = mean(t * − 2001). If the "fake" treatment has a significant effect it means that the regional policy cannot be regarded as responsible for whatever impact we could detect with the model presented in the previous section.
For the second treatment, we use a validity test which is a Granger test (Autor, Donohue III, and Schwab (2006) ; Angrist and Pischke (2009); Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson (2011)) running the following model
where a represents years after the treatment of interest and b years before. This specification allows to control for both pre and post trends, so to check also if causal effects get stronger or weaker as time is passing. If our treatment is effective then we should have that the coefficients of the pre-treatment years are not statistically significant while those of the post-treatment years should be significant and supposedly with a negative sign. 21
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We collected data from the Ministry of Health (MdS), the Italian National Institute of Statistics However, since 2008, regional public providers need to declare the paid medical liability premiums, distinguishing them from other insurance bought by the provider. 22 A check on 2008 data shows that medical liability premium counts on average for 84% of the total paid insurance premiums.
21 Using the same test for the the monitoring policy would imply to loose several Regions from the check, so we decide not to follow this way. See Table 1 for details. 22 For instance, a hospital could buy a fire insurance or against burglary.
All in all, the aggregate measure can be regarded as a good proxy for paid medical malpractice premiums. Legal expenditures are an aggregate measure as well, and they are available only till 2007. Figure 1 shows the per capita increase in paid premiums at the regional level. All Regions experienced an increase which is, on average, approximately equal to 120%. Regions opting for public insurance suffer an increase in paid insurance premiums much lower than the national average: premiums paid in Piemonte increased by 44% and in Friuli Venezia Giulia the increase was only of 13%.
Figure 1 -Premia per capita variation-here
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel from a minimum of 264 structures to a maximum of 323 public healthcare providers. LHUs are the most represented type of healthcare structure in the sample, followed by IHs, THs, and RHs (Table 2) . (Table 3) . A similar trend is detectable for legal expenditures (Table 4) . At a first glance is apparent that paid premiums increased for all the structures in both the treated and not treated sample, and this holds for both treatment types. Tables 6 and 7 show the average paid premiums and legal expenditures for the treatment and control group. Overall, if we considered the treatment on Claims, paid premiums increased on average 97% for the treated while this increase was equal to 142% for the control group. The trend is softer for structures paying premiums in Regions adopting the InsMgmt treatment:
the rate of variation for treated providers is equal to 56%, while non-treated providers experienced an increase of 118% (Table 7) . We provide graphical analysis to show the trend of the variables of interest before and after each Regional treatment introduction. For each policy we consider three years before the treatment and three years after (the year of adoption is included). The trends seem to show evidence that introducing monitoring on malpractice claims decreases paid malpractice premiums ( Figure 2) ; the adoption of the policy seems to have had no impact on legal expenditures (Figure 3 ).
Figure 2 and 3 -Premiums and Legal Expenditures first policy-here
Legal expenditures appear to increase after the introduction of the InsMgmt treatment ( Figure   5 ). Nevertheless, this policy seems to have a decreasing effect on premium expenditures (Figure 4 ). 
Empirical results
We run the models specified in sections 4.1 and 4.2 distinguishing between the entire sample and the sample made by only LHU observations. 23 The split is due to the fact that exit rate has a meaning only for LHU, since it will be the LHU of the patient residency to pay for the care delivered to her by another provider. In Tables 8 and 9 , we show the results of the model described in section 4.1 for both paid malpractice premium and legal expenditures. We present 4 regressions for each sample adding controls in a stepwise way to show the robustness of the treatments' estimates. Regression (4) include litigation rates and duration for the entire sample and exit rate for the sample made only by LHUs.
Tables 8-9-results-here
The impact of P ost1 * Claims (δ) is assessed in a range between -29 (Model 3) and -34% (Model 4), 24 while the impact of P ost2 * InsM gmt (θ) is between -40 (Model 3) and -42% (Model 4). There are no significant effects on legal expenditures although the signs of the coefficients are positive when we consider the introduction of public insurance. Yet, this is an important results for us, because it means that legal expenditures are still mainly driven by other factors. A significant effect on the paid premiums is exerted by the potential population of their patients and the paid payroll, which do not affect in the same way legal expenditures. Mobility rates are not significant even if their sign is consistent with what we could expect when the outcome is paid insurance: negative for entry rate -which stands for good quality -and positive for exit rate -which stands for bad quality. The signs revert when the outcome is legal expenditure with better providers, with 23 We address the autocorrelation problem of DID (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) ) clustering the errors. 24 Model 4 includes observations untill 2007 given the use of the judiciary controls. more patients to treat, having also higher legal expenditures. However the coefficient is significant only when the LHU sub-sample is considered.
Results of the validity tests shown in tables 10-13 confirm the robustness of results shown in tables 8 and 9.
Tables 10-13-results of validity tests-here Tables 10 and 11 show the results when the outcome is paid premiums. While P ost1 t _f ake * Claims r is not significant, the dummies for the post-public insurance adoption shown a general decreasing trend. In model 3 (Table 11 ) the decrease on paid premiums move from 40 (T1) to 47% (T3), while if 2008 is dropped (Model 4) the trend is from 42 (T1) to 36% (T3), yet in this case we are not considering the third year for the structures working in Friuli Venezia Giulia (see Table   1 ). When only LHU observation are considered (Models 7 and 8) the policy impact is definitely growing from 37 (T1) to 43% (T3). There are no effects due to the validity tests on the legal expenditures.
Conclusion
We showed that State initiatives to cope with multiple agency problems can be effective, evaluating their impact on medical malpractice paid premiums at the level of healthcare provider in a mainly public healthcare system. Such positive impact runs along two processes: on the one hand, improving the amount of available information on malpractice (at least on the legal side) produces cheaper insurance. This might be due to an increased ability of local providers to extract the rent from the private bidders, with a raise, for instance, in the public procurement quality indexes (e.g. number of bidders), but it might also due to an increase of better weighted deductibles at the provider level now more aware of their risk exposure. On the other hand, a public insurance solution, together with a Regional level contracting out of the residual risk, decreases as expected insurance expenditures. Given the amount of available information it is impossible to evaluate if this solution is convenient by any means. We produce a check on legal expenditures, which did not increase as a consequence of risk-pooling due to public insurance. Yet, the final check is represented by the comparison between the amount of total compensations paid by the Region and the premium of a competitive private insurance market. If, as usual in medical malpractice, claims ending up with awarded compensations are significantly lower than the originally filed claims, the combo used by the Italian Regions could be a useful benchmark. Note: The total number of structures suffered some changes, namely due to mergers. and WageHealth are in natural log. All regressions include Structure and Year Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the structure level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. and WageHealth are in natural log. All regressions include Structure and Year Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the structure level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. at the structure level in brackets. Robust standard errors clustered at the structure level in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
